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ABSTRACT   The truel, or three way duel, has distinct properties from duels: the weakest contestant often has a very good chance 
to win. This paper explores application of the logic of truels to election campaigns involving negative advertising. We show that 
negative campaigning that pits the leading candidates against each other can create circumstances in which the third (or worse) 
place candidate wins in one or more of the Nash equilibria of the game.  We then study whether the simulated existence of an 
opportunity for Nash equilibrium victory by third place candidates predicts such outcomes in U.S. state-wide elections.
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INTRODUCTION
Cree Deeds was trailing in the 2009 Virginia Democratic 
gubernatorial primary. In third place in the polls. With a 
smaller budget than his rivals. But then one of his rivals 
initiated a negative advertising campaign targeting the 
other.  Deeds partly joined in the attack, while also mak-
ing his positive case to the public. Ultimately, each rival 
seemingly persuaded the public that the other should not 
be chosen, and Deeds won. Like Deeds, sometimes candi-
dates polling in third place (or even less than third place) 
stage surprising election victories. This study explains 
why, as a matter of logic, some of these victories should 
be expected. We synthesize insights from the game theo-
retic study of truels and the political science study of neg-
ative campaigning to develop an original model which 
explains why and when third place candidates sometimes 
stage surprising come-from-behind victories.
This study applies to three-candidate elections with 
negative and positive campaigning the logic of three-way 
duels (called truels) which have principally been studied 
in game theory and mathematics. Our key theoretical 
results show that negative advertising campaigns with 
more than two candidates share a key property with 
other truels -- the potential for the weakest of the contes-
tants to have a good chance of victory.  Writing principally 
in mathematics and game theory journals, Shubik (1954), 
Kilgore (1971/72), and Kilgour and Brams (1997) devel-
oped analyses showing that the poorest shot sometimes 
has the best chance to win a three-way gun fight.  Bring-
ing that insight into political science, this study shows 
that electoral campaigns with negative advertising share 
similar dynamics with gun fight truels even though the 
campaign context is significantly distinct from the gun 
battles analyzed in these earlier models – positive adver-
tising for instance might undermine the chances of the 
weakest to win.  For a range of candidate capabilities, the 
theoretical result of victory by the weakest from the truels 
literature in game theory extends to the electoral cam-
paign context in politics.
No previous model of negative advertising in multi-can-
didate electoral competition has developed the logic of 
victory by the weakest from the truels literature to iden-
tify conditions for victory by the third place candidate.  
In the only previous model of three-candidate negative 
advertising contests,  Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) con-
cluded that in a 2 candidate race the frontrunner would 
engage in more positive advertising than negative, where-
as in a 3 candidate race the third place candidate will only 
engage in positive advertising, and in a 3 candidate race 
no candidate will engage in negative campaigning against 
the weaker of his opponents.  Our model upends all three 
conclusions. Unlike the model of Gandhi et. al. (2016) 
which focuses on the frequency of negative advertising 
as a function of the number of candidates and the exter-
nalities generated by negative advertising, our analysis 
focusses on the conditions in which various advertising 
strategies are in equilibrium in three-candidate races, in-
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cluding equilibria where one or more candidates engage 
in negative advertising.
 
For some political scientists and social choice theorists, 
a model in which an initially weak candidate wins may 
seem familiar to the point of unoriginality. Yet the syn-
thesis offered here of the truels and negative campaign-
ing literatures is unique.  Obviously, the fundamental 
instability results for models of n>2 candidate spatial 
competition imply opportunities for weaker candidates 
to win. And ours is not the first model in which such 
victories are anticipated. Elections are well known to be 
uncertain affairs, polling can be flawed, coordination or 
band-wagoning can create a late surge, and multi-candi-
date multi-dimensional races are inherently unstable or 
subject to cycling.  Yet while useful, all of these answers 
suggest that third (or worse) place is generally a disad-
vantageous place to be, but the weak candidate might 
get lucky. Unlike previous explanations for the puzzle 
of victory by third or worse place candidates, we do not 
attribute their victory to accident, luck, not really being in 
third place, or (directly at least) to the inherent instability 
of multi-candidate choice.
 
We show that victory by the weakest in a negative cam-
paign truel occurs in a Nash equilibrium -- in a context in 
which in an honest and full-information retrospection, 
the managers of the losing yet stronger campaigns would 
have nothing specifically to regret. In the same circum-
stance and with full information, each losing candidate 
could not have won through any unilateral alteration of 
strategy. Indeed, they would have incentives to repeat 
those strategies if the campaign was to develop in the 
same way again, even though those strategies produced 
victory by a third place or weaker candidate with weaker 
initial public support and less money to spend on adver-
tising.
Our analysis has implications for scholarship, showing 
that despite the incentives (Gandhi et. al., 2016) that 
discourage negative advertising in multi-candidate elec-
tions, negative advertising can play a prominent role in 
the equilibria of these elections.  It also has implications 
for campaign strategists and practitioners, highlighting 
the opportunities that negative advertising-focused con-
tests among the leading candidates can create for victory 
by a candidate with less initial support and resources.
 
We proceed as follows.  Sections 1 and 2 develop our key 
theoretical results, first illustrating victory by the weakest 
in the gunfight n>2 duel from the game theory literature 
in mathematics, and then extending that result to the 
more complex context of campaigns with positive and 
negative advertising.  Section 3 then applies those results 
to illustrative cases and an analysis of state-wide U.S. 
elections.  Section 4 concludes. 
1.1 A Gunfight Truel
Before proceeding into the analysis of campaigns, we be-
gin by offering an example of a three way gun fight truel 
to sharpen intuitions concerning the way the outcomes 
of a three way duel studied in the mathematics literature 
often involve victory by the weakest (Amengual and Toral 
2006, Kilgour (1971/72; 1975, 1977), Kilgour and Brams 
1997). A fundamental intuition behind the result is that 
the two most accurate marksmen in a three-way gun fight 
each pose a greater threat to each other than does the 
weakest.  Consequently, each has an incentive to initially 
expend resources attacking the other, which increases 
the odds that the weakest survives. Kilgour (1971/72) 
summed up that “in many cases, the truel has a unique 
equilibrium point at which the player who is the poorest 
marksman has the greatest chance of survival.” 
Imagine that three cowboy gunslingers have mutually 
offended each other and are determined that the only 
way to settle their disagreements is with a three-way 
duel – a truel.  This truel will have two rounds, and each 
combatant has one bullet to use in each of the two 
rounds.  In each round each shooter decides whom to 
target and all three shoot simultaneously.  In the second 
round, the combatants only know who is still alive. It is 
common knowledge that the three gunslingers vary in the 
probability with which they will hit a target they aim at, as 
illustrated in Table 1.  In light of the depth their grievanc-
es, each would rather be the only one alive at the end of 
the truel of the law by citizens.  
The solution to this game is by Subgame Perfect Nash 
equilibrium (Osborne 1995). To solve by backward in-
duction we begin with the last round.  If all three players 
survive, then any targeting strategy is an equilibrium.  If 
only two survive, then they target each other. Because 
each would rather be targeted by a worse shot in round 
two, each cowboy targets their opponent who is the best 
shot in the first round.  In equilibrium one targets two, 
two targets one, and three targets one.  As shown in the 
final row of Table 1, the result of these targeting decisions 
is that there is a very high probability that cowboy three 
(the worst shot of the three) will be the only one to sur-
vive into the second round of the truel.  And the cowboy 
who is the best shot has the worst probability of surviving 
to the second round.  In this instance, as in many other 
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n>2 duels, the outcome is often not victory by the strong 
or the skilled, but victory by the weakest.   
2.1 A Model of Election Advertising 
This section proves that a third place candidate can win 
in equilibrium as the result of a negative advertising truel, 
and that the optimal strategy of the third place candidate 
may involve either positive, or negative advertising de-
pending upon the context and the relative effectiveness 
of positive versus negative advertising.  We then general-
ize this result to show that it persists even if candidates 
can deviate to any mix of positive and negative advertis-
ing strategies.
We study a model of campaign competition which is de-
liberately simplified to include merely candidate support 
levels (the candidate with the most support will win the 
election) on the one hand, and candidate advertising 
budgets (which candidates spend to influence support 
through positive and negative ads) on the other hand.  
The underlying psychological mechanisms driving can-
didate support might include voter perceptions of can-
didate ideological positions (Jessee 2012, Endersby and 
Thomason 1994), it might be candidate valence or likes / 
dislikes (Clarke, et al., 2011, Stokes 1963, 1992), it might 
be party loyalty (Campbell et. al. 1960), retrospective 
evaluations of party or presidential performance (Fiorina 
1981), or something else. 
The assumption that support (S) can be shifted through 
advertising is a basic precondition for any model of 
advertising strategy, and seems borne out by the enor-
mous sums candidates often spend on advertising during 
election campaigns. We assume that positive advertising 
(P) boosts the support of the candidate using it by an 
amount proportionate to the budget B allocated to it 
such that the change in support equals BP or alternately 
P(B). Conversely negative advertising (N) decreases the 
support of the targeted candidate by -BN or alternately 
N(B) (Geer, 2006).  The specific mechanisms of advertising 
influence might vary depending upon which mechanisms 
(discussed above) shaping candidate support are target-
ed.  
Candidates are indexed c = 1, … n, where 1 is the initially 
strongest candidate in support and budget, and n is the 
weakest candidate. The specific context in which the 
campaign is fought is characterized by two parameters 
that set the relative strength of each candidate.  Each 
candidate has a starting support and a starting budget.  
B1, B2 and B3 indicate the starting budget for each candi-
date with B1 > B2 > B3.  S1, S2 and S3 indicate the starting 
level of support for each candidate with S1> S2>S3.  As a 
result of each candidate’s strategy decisions, the bud-
get and support levels change during the game, and the 
player with the highest ending support wins the election.    
Candidate payoffs are assumed to be based upon wheth-
er they win or not with U(win) > U(loss). 
 
Each candidate has 4 options.  The first option is posi-
tive advertising: P indicates that a candidate has chosen 
a positive advertising campaign and B1P is the impact 
on support for candidate 1 from spending budget B on 
positive advertising.  The next two options are negative 
advertising against each one of the opponents: N2 indi-
cates an attack on candidate 2 and N3 indicates an attack 
on candidate 3.  Thus, B1N2 is the change in candidate 2’s 
support brought about by candidate 1 spending budget 
B1 on negative advertising that attacks candidate 2.  Fi-
nally, we allow candidates to decide not to spend (option 
O for out): B1O indicates that candidate 1 has made the 
choice to not spend which leaves all candidate support 
levels unchanged. Since candidate support is always 
higher under positive advertising, this option is weak-
ly dominated by positive advertising (P) so it is of little 
importance in most of our analyses. We also assume that 
negative advertising potentially carries a cost “L” for the 
support of the advertiser as studies have found evidence 
that some types of negative advertising can reduce public 
approval of the candidate doing the attack (Brooks & 
Geer, 2007).  We generalize the model below to allow for 
mixing between options.   
Our model does not assume a specific order of play and 
the interaction modeled occurs within a single round 
in which all candidates move simultaneously. It is thus 
solved using Nash Equilibrium.  Since each of the three 
candidates has four available strategies, there are 64 
possible strategy combinations, each associated with 
a distinct set of final candidate support values.  The 
support levels resulting from a selection of the strategy 
combinations are described in Table 2.  Each cell contains 
the support for candidate 1, candidate 2, and then candi-
date 3.  For instance, in the top left cell of the table we see 
the support of each candidate resulting from a choice by 
candidate 1 to attack candidate 2, and choices by candi-
date 2 and candidate 3 to attack candidate 1.  Here the 
utility of candidate one reflects his or her starting support 
(S1) combined with the reduced  support imposed by 
the attack of candidate 2 (-B2N1), the reduced support  
imposed by the attack of candidate 3 (-B3N1) and the loss 
to support resulting from running a negative campaign 
against candidate 2 (-L). 
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To find equilibria, we identify best responses by each 
candidate to actions by the other candidates, based on 
the assumption that each candidate cares only about 
victory – about having a higher support than any other 
candidate.  On the basis of these best responses, Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies can be identified in which 
no campaign had an incentive to change strategy. There 
are several pure strategy combinations that can produce 
victory for the weakest candidate in equilibrium includ-
ing  (N2, N1, N1), (N2, N1, P), and (P, N1, P).   Each strategy 
profile can be a Nash equilibria of the game for some 
parameter values. 
Claim 1. If all six inequalities (1 through 6) listed below 
are satisfied there a Nash equilibrium (N2, N1, P) in which 
the third place candidate wins the election by adopting a 
positive advertising strategy. 
Conditions for Victory by Third Place Can-
didate Running Positive Campaign While 
Opponents Attack Each Other:
S3 + 
B3P  >
S1 – B2N1 – L (1)
S3 + 
B3P  >
S2 – B1N2 – L (2)
S3 + 
B3P  >
S1 – B2N1 + B1P (3)
S3 + 
B3P  >
S2 – B1N2 + B2P (4)
S2             
>
S1 – B2N1 (5)
S1             
>
S2 – B1N2 (6)
Proof: if first two inequalities (equations 1 and 2) are sat-
isfied, then C3 will win the election if no player deviates 
from the strategy profile.  If the second two inequalities 
are satisfied (equations 3 and 4), then neither of the other 
players can benefit from deviating from this strategy 
profile by running a positive campaign because each will 
still suffer a loss. If the last two inequalities are satisfied 
(equations 5 and 6) then neither of the other candidates 
(1 and 2) can benefit from deviating from this strategy 
profile by attacking candidate 3 instead because this will 
lead to the other of these two candidates winning. For 
instance, if candidate 1 attacks C3 instead of C2, then C2 
wins.  Equations 5 and 6 constitute a closeness condi-
tion: the first and second place candidates must be close 
enough to each other than each cannot win if the other is 
permitted to run unanswered negative attacks. 
Since inequalities 1, 2 and 4 will be satisfied if 3 is satis-
fied (following from the relatively weaker support and 
budget of the second place candidate), we solve for the 
critical starting support and budget levels of the third 
place candidate using inequality 3.  The critical support 
level for the third place candidate to be able to win in 
equilibrium with a positive campaign if the closeness 
condition is satisfied is:
S3    > S1 – B2N1 + B1P - B3P    
And the critical budget level for victory by the third place 
candidate is: 
B3  > (S1 – B2N1 + B1P - S3)/P  
Claim 2. An alternate set of closeness conditions obtain 
when the first place candidate adopts a positive advertis-
ing strategy in the Nash equilibrium (P, N1, P) with candi-
dates 1 and 3 running positive campaigns, and candidate 
2 running a negative campaign. Equations 1 through 4 
must still be satisfied.  The alternative conditions to Equa-
tions 5 and 6 are 8 and 9 below:
Conditions for Victory by Third Place Can-
didate Running Positive Campaign While 
Opponents Attack Each Other:
S3 + 
B3P  >
S1 – B2N1 – L (1)
S3 + 
B3P  >
S2 – B1N2 – L (2)
S3 + 
B3P  >
S1 – B2N1 + B1P (3)
S3 + 
B3P  >
S2 – B1N2 + B2P (4)
S2             
>
S1 – B2N1 (5)
S1             
>
S2 – B1N2 (6)
If the conditions in equations 3 and 7 are satisfied, then 
candidate 3 will win.  If the condition in equation 8 is 
satisfied, then player 1 cannot win by shifting to an attack 
on player 3 (and obviously shifting to an attack on player 
2 will not lead to victory if equation 3 holds). If the condi-
tion in equation 9 is satisfied, then player 2 cannot win by 
shifting to a positive campaign (and obviously shifting to 
an attack on player 3 will not lead to victory if equation 9 
is true). 
Claim 3. For the third place candidate to win in equilibri-
um through a negative advertising strategy of attacking 
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the first place candidate (N2, N1, N1), the following condi-
tions must hold:  
Conditions for Victory by Third 
Place Candidate Running Nega-
tive Campaign:
S3   
>
S1 – B2N1 – B3N1 (10)
S3   
>
S2 – B1N2 (11)
S3  
>
S1 – B2N1 – B3N1 + B1P + L (12)
S3  
>
S2 – B1N2 + B2P + L (13)
S2  
>
S1 – B2N1  – B3N1 (14)
S1  
>
S2 – B1N2 + B3N1 (15)
Proof: if the conditions outlined in equations 10 and 
11 prevail, then candidate 3 will win because the third 
candidate will have the highest level of support.  If the 
conditions outlined in equations 12 and 13 prevail then 
neither of the other candidates can win by deviating from 
the posited equilibrium strategy individually to run a pos-
itive campaign, and if the closeness conditions in 14 and 
15 obtain, then neither candidate can deviate to an attack 
on candidate 3 without losing to the other candidate: if 
candidate 1 attacks 3, then candidate 2 wins.  Condition 
15 always obtains by assumption because S1>S2 and 
B1N2  > B3N1.
Note that a critical condition for this equilibrium is that 
attack by the first-place candidate on the second place 
candidate must be sufficiently powerful that the second 
place candidate has a lower support than the third place 
candidate (equation 11).  Thus, the second-place can-
didate must be weaker than was required in claim 1, so 
there are conditions in which a positive campaign by the 
third-place candidate would bring victory but a negative 
campaign would not.  On the other hand, when B3P < 
B3N1 – L, the condition in equation 12 will be met more 
readily than the condition in equation 3, indicating the 
existence of circumstances in which the unique winning 
strategy in equilibrium is for the third place candidate 
to attack if negative advertising has a sufficiently larger 
impact than positive advertising.  
Figure 1 illustrates that when positive and negative cam-
paigning have equal effectiveness, the weakest candidate 
is generally best off running a positive campaign.  For the 
selected parameter values, a positive campaign by the 
weakest candidate can result in victory in every circum-
stance in which a negative campaign would also lead to 
victory, but there are also a range of initial budget and 
support levels for the weakest candidate for which only 
a positive campaign can generate a Nash equilibrium 
in which the weakest wins.  The area within the triangle 
bounded by dotted lines indicates the range of parameter 
values for which the third-place candidate is weakest yet 
can win in equilibrium by running a positive campaign.  
The quadrilateral bounded by dashed lines indicates the 
range of parameter values for which the third-place can-
didate is weakest in respect to both support and budget, 
yet can win in equilibrium by running a negative cam-
paign against the first place candidate. 
2.2 Extension to Mixed Advertising Campaigns 
So far, we have maintained the simplifying assumption 
that candidates must devote the entirety of their resourc-
es to a single advertising strategy.  The purpose of this 
section is to show that equilibria involving victory by the 
third-place candidate (3) still occur when candidates can 
devote their budget to a mix of advertising strategies.
 
We now allow candidates to select any combination of 
strategies.  Let b1P + b1N2 + b1N3+ b1O=B1 represent 
the portions of candidate 1’s budget being devoted to 
each of the available strategies.  Thus, if b1P = b1N2 = 
B1/2, candidate 1 is devoting half of his or her budget to 
positive campaigning, and half to negative attacks on 
candidate two.  For simplicity we drop the assumption (L) 
that negative campaigning hurts the candidate engaging 
in it below.
Claim 4. For candidate three to win in equilibrium under 
mixed advertising strategies the following conditions 
must hold: 
Proof:  If equation 16 is true, then the support of candi-
date 3 exceeds that of candidate 1, and if equation 17 
is true, then the support of candidate 3 exceeds that of 
candidate 2.  Hence, candidate 3 will have the highest 
support, and will win. 
For this to be an equilibrium, all candidates must be 
choosing budget shares that best respond to all other 
candidates with the above inequalities satisfied.  There-
fore, it must be the case that neither candidate 1 nor 
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Table 1. A Gun-Fight Truel
Probability (hits 
target)
Equilibrium probability of 
survival into second round
Cowboy 1 0.9 6 percent
Cowboy 2 0.8 10 percent
Cowboy 3 0.7 100 percent
Table 2. Candidate Support as a Result of Strategic Choices
C3=N1
C2 = N1 C2 = N3 C2 = P C2 = O
C1 = N2 S1- B2N1- B3N1-L, S2- B1N2-L, S3-L S1 - B3N1-L, S2- B1N2-L, S3- B2N3-L S1 - B3N1-L, S2+ B2P- B1N2, S3-L S1 - B3N1-L, S2 - B1N2, S3-L
C1 = N3 S1 - B2N1- B3N1-L,S2 -L, S3- B1N3-L S1 - B3N1-L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3-L S1 - B3N1-L, S2+ B2P, S3- B1N3-L S1 - B3N1-L, S2, S3- B1N3-L
C1 = P S1+ B1P - B2N1- B3N1, S2- L, S3-L S1+ B1P - B3N1, S2- L, S3- B2N3-L S1+ B1P - B3N1, S2+ B2P, S3-L S1+ B1P - B3N1, S2, S3-L
C1 = O S1 - B2N1- B3N1,S2- L, S3-L S1 - B3N1, S2- L, S3- B2N3-L S1 - B3N1, S2+ B2P, S3-L S1 - B3N1, S2, S3-L
C3=N2
C1 = N2 S1- B2N1 -L, S2-B1N2-B3N2-L, S3-L S1 -L, S2- B1N2-B3N2-L, S3- B2N3-L S1 -L, S2+ B2P- B1N2-B3N2, S3-L S1 -L, S2- B1N2-B3N2, S3-L
C1 = N3 S1 - B2N1-L, S2-B3N2 -L, S3- B1N3-L S1 -L, S2-B3N2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3-L S1 -L, S2+ B2P-B3N2, S3- B1N3-L S1 -L, S2-B3N2, S3- B1N3-L
C1 = P S1+ B1P - B2N1, S2-B3N2- L, S3-L S1+ B1P , S2-B3N2- L, S3- B2N3-L S1+ B1P , S2+ B2P-B3N2, S3-L S1+ B1P , S2-B3N2, S3-L
C1 = O S1 - B2N1, S2-B3N2- L, S3-L S1, S2-B3N2- L, S3- B2N3-L S1, S2+ B2P-B3N2, S3-L S1, S2-B3N2, S3-L
C3 = P
C1 = N2 S1- B2N1 -L, S2-B1N2 -L, S3+B3P S1 -L, S2- B1N2-L, S3- B2N3+B3P S1 -L, S2+ B2P- B1N2, S3+B3P S1 -L, S2- B1N2, S3+B3P
C1 = N3 S1 - B2N1-L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3 +B3P S1 -L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3+B3P S1 -L, S2+ B2P, S3- B1N3+B3P S1 -L, S2, S3- B1N3+B3P
C1 = P S1+B1P - B2N1, S2- L, S3+B3P S1+ B1P , S2- L, S3- B2N3+B3P S1+ B1P , S2+ B2P, S3+B3P S1+ B1P , S2, S3+B3P
C1 = O S1- B2N1, S2- L, S3+B3P S1, S2- L, S3- B2N3+B3P S1, S2+ B2P, S3+B3P S1, S2, S3+B3P
C3 = O
C1 = N2 S1- B2N1 -L, S2-B1N2 -L, S3 S1 -L, S2- B1N2-L, S3- B2N3 S1 -L, S2+ B2P- B1N2, S3 S1 -L, S2- B1N2, S3
C1 = N3 S1 - B2N1-L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3 S1 -L, S2 -L, S3- B1N3- B2N3 S1 -L, S2+ B2P, S3- B1N3 S1 -L, S2, S3- B1N3
C1 = P S1+B1P - B2N1, S2- L, S3 S1+ B1P , S2- L, S3- B2N3 S1+ B1P , S2+ B2P, S3 S1+ B1P , S2, S3
C1 = O S1- B2N1, S2- L, S3 S1, S2- L, S3- B2N3 S1, S2+ B2P, S3 S1, S2, S3
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candidate 2 has an individual incentive to deviate from 
their strategy. In other words, holding the other candi-
date’s strategies constant, there must be no deviation 
that allows a losing candidate to gain a larger level of 
support than the strongest of the other candidates.  In the 
absence of such a strategy, each candidate will be indif-
ferent between their alternatives, which is the necessary 
condition for maintaining the mixed strategy.  If equation 
18 holds, then candidate 1 has no feasible combination 
of positive and negative advertising that allows the 
candidate to win (though as above in pure strategies, the 
candidate might be able to choose which of his or her 
opponents will win).   Similarly, if equation 19 holds, then 
candidate 2 has no feasible combination of positive and 
negative advertising strategies that allows the candidate 
to win.
This analysis shows that there continue to be conditions 
in which a negative advertising truel produces victory for 
the weakest candidate, even if the other candidates can 
play a mix of strategies.  Figure 3 illustrates the range of 
budget and support values under which a Nash equilib-
rium exists that leads to victory by the weakest candi-
date by adding lines delineating the boundaries of the 
area in which an equilibrium exists in which the winning 
candidate is initially the weakest as a function of the 
initial budget and support of the candidates.  To facili-
tate comparison, the parameters for the effectiveness of 
positive versus negative campaigning, and the support 
and budget values of the leading candidates are kept the 
same as in Figure 2. In addition, we assume that the third 
place candidate only plays one strategy – either b3P = 
B3 or b3N1 = B3. For this set of parameters, the region in 
which positive campaigning by the weakest candidate 
can produce victory shrinks, but the area in which nega-
tive campaigning by the weakest candidate can produce 
victory increases once all candidates are permitted to se-
lect mixed strategies that potentially involve both positive 
advertising and attacks one or both opponents. 
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